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Mobile Check Deposit
Sign, Snap, Submit. Deposit checks from anywhere with the Citi MobileSM app.
Gain the flexibility and convenience of depositing a check into your Citibank® checking account wherever and whenever it is most convenient for you. Mobile Check Deposit is a free1 service available on your Citi Mobile app for iPhone®, iPod touch® and AndroidTM devices. And it's as easy to use as your phone's camera.

How to get the app:

Download the app on your phone, or text "App" to MYCITI (692484) to have a link sent to you directly.



Right for you if:

You have an iPhone®, iPod touch® or AndroidTM deviceYou're busy and it isn't always convenient for you to visit a branchYou have a Citibank personal checking account

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Fiat money is money that derives its value from government regulation or law. The term fiat currency is also used when the fiat money is used as the main currency of the country. The term derives from the Latin fiat ("let it be done", "it shall be").[1]
Fiat money originated in 11th century China,[2] and its use became widespread during the Yuan and Ming dynasties.[3] During the 13th century, Marco Polo described the fiat money of the Yuan Dynasty in his book The Travels of Marco Polo.[4][5] The Nixon Shock of 1971 ended the direct convertibility of the United States dollar to gold. Since then all reserve currencies have been fiat currencies, including the U.S. dollar and the Euro.[6]

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Ratings Game
FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, March 2012, Vol. 49, No. 1
Panayotis Gavras
PDF version
Private credit rating agencies have been thrust into providing a public function because regulators have not come up with an alternative

CREDIT rating agencies have become an essential part of the financial landscape. These private companies assess credit risk for companies and governments seeking to take out loans and issue fixed-income securities, such as bonds. Reliance on these agencies is so entrenched that prospective borrowers often must obtain a credit rating before they try to raise money in capital markets. The ratings provide prospective lenders with guidance on the borrower’s creditworthiness, which contributes to the determination of the interest rate, or price, the borrower must pay for financing.
But these private rating agencies’ assessments, which are designed for private financial markets, have been inserted into the public domain—regulators across the globe use them, for example, to assess the riskiness of bank portfolios and determine how much capital institutions must hold to guard against insolvency. With regulators’ growing emphasis on risk as the basis of capital adequacy, the credit rating agencies’ assessment of that risk has, in effect, been turned into a public good.
Box 1. The big three
Credit rating agencies, some of which trace their origins to the 19th century, assess the credit risk of debt issued by companies and governments and assess investment products such as collateralized debt obligations. The agencies generally assign a grade, called a rating, that ranges from highest quality with little risk to lowest quality with little or no likelihood of repayment.
The rating business is dominated by three firms—Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch. Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, headquartered in New York City, each have about 40 percent of the global business, and Fitch, with headquarters in New York and London, has about 10 percent. Smaller rating agencies are scattered across the globe, mostly in country- and product-specific niches.
Putting credit rating agencies—mainly Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch (see Box 1)—into the public regulatory domain has had two consequences. First, it changed the nature of banking regulation from reliance on static, fixed percentages to use of dynamic scores that can change according to a rating agency’s assessment of credit risk. This introduced greater sophistication, but also greater complexity and the possibility of incorrect, outdated, or otherwise misleading risk assessments. Second, it led to the entrenchment of private entities in regulation—a domain normally reserved for the public sector. Most discussion of rating agencies has focused on conflict of interest and other problems as they relate to assessment quality. Far less has been said about the potential for a serious conflict of interest between the objectives of privately owned credit rating agencies seeking to maximize shareholder value and the objectives of the regulatory role they play, even if they did not seek that role.
As authorities reexamine the regulatory and supervisory failures during the run-up to the global crisis, they must look at the reliance on credit rating agencies. Although any assessment must take into account the costs of making changes, there are a variety of potential paths—including reforming the rating agencies, bringing them under public control, or finding alternatives to them.
Evolution of credit ratings
Box 2. The Basel Accords
The first Basel Accord, dubbed Basel I, agreed to in 1988 by a forum of central bank governors of the world’s 10 largest economies, was meant as guidance for regulators of internationally active banks.
The group—now called the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, with 27 members—is hosted in Basel, Switzerland, by the Bank for International Settlements, an independent organization of central banks.
There have been three formal accords—which look at such issues as how to determine the amount of capital banks should be required to maintain. Basel II was agreed to in 2004, while agreement on Basel III, a comprehensive set of reforms, was reached in September 2010. Implementation of its recommendations is still under discussion.
As financial markets grew increasingly complex, borrowing opportunities expanded dramatically and the ability of a lender to obtain full information about potential borrowers became ever more difficult. Through economies of scale, rating agencies are able to offer cost-effective information services that narrow the gap between what an investor knows about a borrower and what the borrower knows, assigning each borrower a grade, called a rating. By narrowing such information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, agencies promote liquidity in markets, increasing financial activity and reducing costs. Borrowers with higher (that is, better) credit ratings typically enjoy greater and easier access to financing at lower cost, because they are deemed less risky and more likely to repay in full what they owe, including interest. Frequently, ratings represent the initial reference point in the due diligence process.
Although credit rating agencies are private firms, their role in financial regulatory frameworks has expanded since the 1970s—especially as a result of an international agreement to assess bank portfolios based on the risk of their assets and set capital requirements accordingly. This so-called Basel II Accord sought to add nuance to regulatory standards (see Box 2). A key justification for the incorporation of rating agencies’ credit assessments was the belief that they offered a more sophisticated approach to measuring credit risk than did the simpler regulatory practice of basing capital requirements on a fixed percentage of total assets—the approach in the earlier Basel I Accord, which allowed for much less differentiation.
Hardwired
The postcrisis debate over the role of credit rating agencies in financial regulation has focused primarily on issues such as conflict of interest and adequacy of performance. Among the questions are how the rating agencies assign ratings, what they rate, and whether ratings fueled the precrisis lending boom and resulting asset bubbles and provoked an opposite and pernicious effect after the crisis. These are valid concerns, but they also underscore how credit rating agencies have become an essential part of the financial system—“hardwired” if you will, in such a way that they take the place of due diligence rather than supplement informed decision making (BIS, 2009). This hardwiring results, in part, from the investment strategies of banks, investment funds, and other private entities. Primarily, though, it stems from credit rating agencies’ institutionalized role in public policy activities—chiefly in banking regulation, but also in areas such as determination of the eligibility of collateral in central bank operations and investment decisions of publicly controlled or operated funds, such as pension funds.
The use of agency ratings in financial regulation amounts both to privatization of the regulatory process—inherently a government responsibility—and to abdication by government of one of its key duties in order to obtain purported benefits such as lower regulation costs and greater efficiency and nuance.
A form of government failure
This surrender of regulatory responsibility to private agencies can be considered a form of government failure because the state in effect transfers regulatory authority to private firms but retains responsibility for the overall outcome. This approach is problematic for a number of reasons:
• Credit rating agencies aim to maximize profits and shareholder value. Although they have a powerful incentive to provide trustworthy information, they do not have the same mandate as a regulatory agency charged with providing information in the interest of the public. When the private motive and the public imperative are not fully compatible, there is potential for conflict and confusion. One or both may suffer. If the public imperative suffers, it undermines the credibility of the regulatory process.
• The licensing and regulation of credit rating agencies have been astonishingly limited (Katz, Salinas, and Stephanou, 2009). Agencies are selected mainly because of market recognition, rather than codified regulatory requirements or licensing. Systems of assessment and validation of methodologies used, processes for authorization of the rating agencies, and monitoring systems to ensure accountability have been weak—cursory at best.
• Even if a rating agency enjoys an excellent track record, the credibility of the regulatory process risks erosion because ratings are inherently fallible; they depend on judgments. In the marketplace, if a credit rating agency crosses a threshold of unreliability, it will lose customers and eventually fail. However, if it is part of the regulatory framework, its mistakes may have severe implications, and even if a poor performer can eventually be removed, how can a credit rating agency fail as long as it is part of the regulatory framework? Who will be liable if the agency’s opinions result in distortions—especially if financial institutions end up holding too little capital? A faulty rating would mislead those dependent on it, with a potentially high price to pay. Rating agencies regularly caution that their ratings are only opinion and that they are not accountable for the outcome of ratings being incorporated into regulation. Perhaps they understand the nature of the problem better than government authorities do.
• Rating changes move markets, affecting the value of assets and thus capital requirements. They also affect whether those assets can be used as collateral. This is not inherently bad (indeed such changes are intended to affect assessments of riskiness and asset prices), but a change may cause sudden destabilization, unnecessarily raise volatility, and/or lead to overshooting of the asset’s value, particularly in the event of a downgrade. Ratings changes, then, can cause regulation-induced crises. Moreover, the due diligence of investors whose decisions are tied to ratings (for example, certain pension funds) is diminished or even overridden because of the overwhelming importance of credit ratings.
• Credit rating agencies have long enjoyed considerable influence over market movements because of the faith placed in them by those who demand their services. The enshrinement of their role in regulation multiplies their potential power. It further distorts competition in an industry that has oligopolistic tendencies, because consumers benefit not only by being able to compare different asset classes under one rating system but also by not having to decipher the methodologies of numerous credit rating agencies. For users, fewer agencies are easier and better.
Moreover, even if eligible private credit rating agencies do their job admirably, there is always the potential for the appearance of impropriety—including whether ratings judgments are consciously or unconsciously affected by the fact that rating agencies are paid by the potential borrowers rather than potential lenders. The possibility of impropriety can as easily undermine the credibility of the process as any actual wrongdoing.

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Deal or no deal, ObamaCare taxes poised to hit next month
Published December 08, 2012
FoxNews.com
AP


Even if lawmakers somehow stop the Bush-era tax rates from expiring, taxes are still expected to rise on Jan. 1 -- thanks to a trio of new fees tied to the federal health care overhaul.
The IRS this past week published rules for some of the first major taxes meant to help pay for President Obama’s massive insurance coverage expansion. Together, they will raise investment and income taxes on top earners and impose a separate -- and controversial -- tax on medical devices.
The bundle of fees has been largely overlooked as lawmakers and the White House bicker over the Bush tax rates, with Republicans demanding they be extended for everyone and Obama insisting rates rise for top earners. But that same group of earners is already in the crosshairs under the ObamaCare tax rules published this week.
Starting Jan. 1, investment income for individuals earning over $200,000 and households earning over $250,000 will be subject to a new 3.8 percent tax. Further, regular income above those thresholds will be hit with a .9 percent Medicare surtax. Should the Bush tax rates expire for those workers, those increases will be compounded.......................>>>>........................>>>>..................Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/politic.....month/#ixzz2EeVGiT6W

Quoted from DemocraticVoiceOfReason

Certain neo-liberals would like you to believe that the Democrats won a huge victory in November.  Tax and spend neo-liberals like Obama and certain Pelosipalooza Congresspeople think that they now have a blank check from the American voters to raise taxes and spend us further into debt.


My hope is that the House Republicans stand firm .

Quoted from senders

I wonder if our 'new insurance' ( b : coverage by contract whereby one party undertakes to indemnify or guarantee another against    loss by a specified contingency or peril c : the sum for which something is insured 2: a means of guaranteeing protection or safety
)  will provide 'free' hemorrhoid cream.  

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How the Health Care Surcharge Works
• The bill would require the top 1.2% of earners – households with adjusted gross income in excess of
$350,000 (married filing a joint return) and $280,000 (single) – to contribute towards the cost of
providing access to affordable health care for all Americans through a new health care surcharge.  
• The health care surcharge only applies to income earned in excess of $350,000.  For example:
o For a family making $350,000, no surcharge would apply.  
o For a family making $351,000, the 1% surcharge would apply to $1,000 (income in excess of the
$350,000 and below $500,000).    
o For a family making $501,000, the 1.5% surcharge would apply to $1,000 (income in excess of
$500,000 and below $1,000,000), and the 1% surcharge would apply to income between
$350,000 and $500,000.  
o For a family making $1,001,000, the 5.4% surcharge would apply to $1,000 (income in excess of
$1,000,000), the 1.5% surcharge would apply income between $500,000 and below $1,000,000,
and the 1% surcharge would apply to income between $350,000 and $500,000.  
• If the health reforms included in the bill achieve projected cost savings, families making between
$350,000 and $1,000,000 will need to contribute less than 1% of their annual income to help
provide access to affordable health care for all Americans.  
Adjusted Gross Income
% of
Households*
Maximum Amount They Could
Owe
1%Rate
$350,000 - $500,000 joint
($280,000 - $400,000 single)
0.50%  $0 - $1,500
1.5% Rate
$500,000 - $1,000,000 joint
($400,000 - $800,000 single)
0.45%  $1,500 - $9,000
5.4% rate
Over $1,000,000 joint
(over $800,000 single)
0.27%  $9,000 + 5.4% of income OVER
$1 million
*Source:  Joint Committee on Taxation.
There is an expectation that the reforms included in the bill will generate greater health savings than the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected in scoring the cost of the bill.  As a result, the bill includes a
trigger that would completely eliminate the surcharges (for tax years after 2012) on households making
between $350,000 and $1,000,000 if, in December 2012, the Office of Management and Budget determines
that there will be more than $175 billion in extra savings above the savings currently projected by CBO.  
If the extra savings are less than $150 billion, the 1% and 1.5% health care surcharges would increase by a
factor of two (i.e., 2% and 3%).   If the extra savings exceed $150 billion but are less than $175 billion, the 1%
and 1.5% health care surcharges would remain unchanged.  

Quoted from DemocraticVoiceOfReason

The FACT is that many life-long Democrats are fed up with the far left ward tilt of our party and the audacity of certain elected Federal representatives to REFUSE to even listen - let alone answer - the questions and concerns of area voters.

Don't be suckered into agreeing to tax increases and don't back down from DEMANDING and GETTING real cuts in Federal spending.  

The fight for REAL spending and tax reform is far from over.  2014 and 2016 will be opportunities to send the Pelosipalooza packing for good and finally electing a president who knows how to govern and is not a hard core left-wing extremist.

Quoted from Box A Rox

The Continuing Dumbing-Down of the Republican Party


"It weakens the entire Republican Party, the Republican majority.
It's the continuing dumbing-down of the Republican Party and we are going to be seen
more and more as a bunch of extremists that can't even get a majority of our own people
to support policies that we're putting forward."

-- Rep. Steven LaTourette (R-OH), quoted by Roll Call, on the failure of House Speaker John Boehner's
"Plan B" to avoid the fiscal cliff.